Ask Warren Buffett

Recorded answer · 2026-10-31

Answers from 25 Berkshire Hathaway shareholder letters, 1998–2023, with the passages each answer used.

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recorded 2026-10-31 · 12,063 ms

5passages

Claude answered from 5 passages in the 2002, 2003, 2005, and 2008 letters.

Answer

Buffett is deeply wary of complex financial products, derivatives above all. He sees them as hard to understand, hard to control, and dangerous to the whole system. But he will use them himself when the price is wrong in Berkshire's favor and the structure protects Berkshire.

They can't be understood (2002). Even professionals can't see through them. "When Charlie and I finish reading the long footnotes detailing the derivatives activities of major banks, the only thing we understand is that we don't understand how much risk the institution is running." He adds that other types of derivatives severely curtail the ability of regulators to curb leverage, and that total-return swaps of this type make a joke of margin requirements.

The danger is systemic (2002, 2008). He grants that on a micro level, what they say is often true, meaning derivatives can transfer risk to stronger hands. But Charlie and I believe, however, that the macro picture is dangerous and getting more so. Large amounts of risk, particularly credit risk, have become concentrated in the hands of relatively few derivatives dealers, who in addition trade extensively with one other. The troubles of one could quickly infect the others. He cites Long-Term Capital Management as proof. In 2008 he returned to the theme: a frightening web of mutual dependence develops among huge financial institutions. His summary from 2002: derivatives are financial weapons of mass destruction, carrying dangers that, while now latent, are potentially lethal.

Experience confirmed it (2003). On Gen Re's derivatives operation, he and Munger found that reported profits struck us as illusory, and we felt that the business carried sizable risks that could not effectively be measured or limited. He admits I, however, dithered. As a consequence, our shareholders are paying a far higher price than was necessary to exit this business.

When he uses them anyway (2008). Berkshire held 251 derivatives contracts. His reason: I believe each contract we own was mispriced at inception, sometimes dramatically so. The terms were set to protect Berkshire. Counterparties pay up front, so Berkshire therefore always holds the money, which leaves us assuming no meaningful counterparty risk. Only a small percentage of our contracts call for any posting of collateral when the market moves against us. He also takes personal responsibility, believing the CEO of any large financial organization must be the Chief Risk Officer as well.

The underlying principle (2002, 2005). All of this follows from his view that Berkshire should be a fortress of financial strength – for the sake of our owners, creditors, policyholders and employees. In 2005 he wrote that we are quite willing to accept huge risks, but whatever occurs, though, Berkshire will have the net worth, the earnings streams and the liquidity to handle the problem with ease. Any other approach is dangerous.

In short, he avoids complexity he can't measure. He uses derivatives only when they are clearly mispriced and structured so Berkshire holds the cash and can't be forced into a bind.

Retrieved passages

Top 5 of 673 by cosine similarity

  • 2002 letter 0.547

    Similarly, even experienced investors and analysts encounter major problems in analyzing the financial condition of firms that are heavily involved with derivatives contracts.

    Full passage · 4,117 characters

    get their arms around the risk profiles of banks, insurers and other financial institutions. Similarly, even experienced investors and analysts encounter major problems in analyzing the financial condition of firms that are heavily involved with derivatives contracts. When Charlie and I finish reading the long footnotes detailing the derivatives activities of major banks, the only thing we understand is that we don’t understand how much risk the institution is running. The derivatives genie is now well out of the bottle, and these instruments will almost certainly multiply in variety and number until some event makes their toxicity clear. Knowledge of how dangerous they are has already permeated the electricity and gas businesses, in which the eruption of major troubles caused the use of derivatives to diminish dramatically. Elsewhere, however, the derivatives business continues to expand unchecked. Central banks and governments have so far found no effective way to control, or even monitor, the risks posed by these contracts. Charlie and I believe Berkshire should be a fortress of financial strength – for the sake of our owners, creditors, policyholders and employees. We try to be alert to any sort of megacatastrophe risk, and that posture may make us unduly apprehensive about the burgeoning quantities of long-term derivatives contracts and the massive amount of uncollateralized receivables that are growing alongside. In our view, however, derivatives are financial weapons of mass destruction, carrying dangers that, while now latent, are potentially lethal. Investments Below we show our common stock investments. Those that had a market value of more than $500 million at the end of 2002 are itemized. 12/31/02 Shares CompanyCostMarket (dollars in millions) 151,610,700American Express Company .....................................................................$ 1,470$ 5,359 200,000,000The Coca-Cola Company ..........................................................................1,2998,768 96,000,000The Gillette Company................................................................................6002,915 15,999,200H&R Block, Inc. ........................................................................................255643 6,708,760M&T Bank.................................................................................................103532 24,000,000Moody’s Corporation.................................................................................499991 1,727,765The Washington Post Company ................................................................111,275 53,265,080Wells Fargo & Company ...........................................................................3062,497 Others ........................................................................................................ 4,621 5,383 Total Common Stocks ...............................................................................$9,164$28,363 We continue to do little in equities. Charlie and I are increasingly comfortable with our holdings in Berkshire’s major investees because most of them have increased their earnings while their valuations have decreased. But we are not inclined to add to them. Though these enterprises have good prospects, we don’t yet believe their shares are undervalued. In our view, the same conclusion fits stocks generally. Despite three years of falling prices, which have significantly improved the attractiveness of common stocks, we still find very few that even mildly 16 interest us. That dismal fact is testimony to the insanity of valuations reached during The Great Bubble. Unfortunately, the hangover may prove to be proportional to the binge. The aversion to equities that Charlie and I exhibit today is far from congenital. We love owning common stocks – if they can be purchased at attractive prices. In my 61 years of investing, 50 or so years have offered that kind of opportunity. There will be years like that again. Unless, however, we see a very high probability of at least 10% pre-tax returns (which translate to 6½-7% after corporate tax), we

  • 2008 letter 0.538

    Additionally, a frightening web of mutual dependence develops among huge financial institutions. Receivables and payables by the billions become concentrated in the hands of a few large dealers who are apt to be…

    Full passage · 3,085 characters

    of financial statements though these items will not be validated for many years. Additionally, a frightening web of mutual dependence develops among huge financial institutions. Receivables and payables by the billions become concentrated in the hands of a few large dealers who are apt to be highly-leveraged in other ways as well. Participants seeking to dodge troubles face the same problem as someone seeking to avoid venereal disease: It’s not just whomyousleep with, but also whomtheyare sleeping with. 17 Sleeping around, to continue our metaphor, can actually be useful for large derivatives dealers because it assures them government aid if trouble hits. In other words, only companies having problems that can infect the entire neighborhood – I won’t mention names – are certain to become a concern of the state (an outcome, I’m sad to say, that is proper). From this irritating reality comesThe First Law of Corporate Survivalfor ambitious CEOs who pile on leverage and run large and unfathomable derivatives books: Modest incompetence simply won’t do; it’s mindboggling screw-ups that are required. Considering the ruin I’ve pictured, you may wonder why Berkshire is a party to 251 derivatives contracts (other than those used for operational purposes at MidAmerican and the few left over at Gen Re). The answer is simple: I believe each contract we own was mispriced at inception, sometimes dramatically so. I both initiated these positions and monitor them, a set of responsibilities consistent with my belief that the CEO of any large financial organizationmustbe the Chief Risk Officer as well. If we lose money on our derivatives, it will be my fault. Our derivatives dealings require our counterparties to make payments to us when contracts are initiated. Berkshire therefore always holds the money, which leaves us assuming no meaningful counterparty risk. As of yearend, the payments made to us less losses we have paid – our derivatives “float,” so to speak – totaled $8.1 billion. This float is similar to insurance float: If we break even on an underlying transaction, we will have enjoyed the use of free money for a long time. Our expectation, though it is far from a sure thing, is that we will do better than break even and that the substantial investment income we earn on the funds will be frosting on the cake. Only a small percentage of our contracts call for any posting of collateral when the market moves against us. Even under the chaotic conditions existing in last year’s fourth quarter, we had to post less than 1% of our securities portfolio. (When we post collateral, we deposit it with third parties, meanwhile retaining the investment earnings on the deposited securities.) In our 2002 annual report, we warned of the lethal threat that posting requirements create, real-life illustrations of which we witnessed last year at a variety of financial institutions (and, for that matter, at Constellation Energy, which was within hours of bankruptcy when MidAmerican arrived to effect a rescue). Our contracts fall into four major categories. With

  • 2002 letter 0.534

    When a “chain reaction” threat exists within an industry, it pays to minimize links of any kind. That’s how we conduct our reinsurance business, and it’s one reason we are exiting derivatives.

    Full passage · 3,180 characters

    of the travails of other firms further down the chain. When a “chain reaction” threat exists within an industry, it pays to minimize links of any kind. That’s how we conduct our reinsurance business, and it’s one reason we are exiting derivatives. Many people argue that derivatives reduce systemic problems, in that participants who can’t bear certain risks are able to transfer them to stronger hands. These people believe that derivatives act to stabilize the economy, facilitate trade, and eliminate bumps for individual participants. And, on a micro level, what they say is often true. Indeed, at Berkshire, I sometimes engage in large-scale derivatives transactions in order to facilitate certain investment strategies. Charlie and I believe, however, that the macro picture is dangerous and getting more so. Large amounts of risk, particularly credit risk, have become concentrated in the hands of relatively few derivatives dealers, who in addition trade extensively with one other. The troubles of one could quickly infect the others. On top of that, these dealers are owed huge amounts by non-dealer counterparties. Some of these counterparties, as I’ve mentioned, are linked in ways that could cause them to contemporaneously run into a problem because of a single event (such as the implosion of the telecom industry or the precipitous decline in the value of merchant power projects). Linkage, when it suddenly surfaces, can trigger serious systemic problems. Indeed, in 1998, the leveraged and derivatives-heavy activities of a single hedge fund, Long-Term Capital Management, caused the Federal Reserve anxieties so severe that it hastily orchestrated a rescue effort. In later Congressional testimony, Fed officials acknowledged that, had they not intervened, the outstanding trades of LTCM – a firm unknown to the general public and employing only a few hundred 15 people – could well have posed a serious threat to the stability of American markets. In other words, the Fed acted because its leaders were fearful of what might have happened to other financial institutions had the LTCM domino toppled. And this affair, though it paralyzed many parts of the fixed-income market for weeks, was far from a worst-case scenario. One of the derivatives instruments that LTCM used was total-return swaps, contracts that facilitate 100% leverage in various markets, including stocks. For example, Party A to a contract, usually a bank, puts up all of the money for the purchase of a stock while Party B, without putting up any capital, agrees that at a future date it will receive any gain or pay any loss that the bank realizes. Total-return swaps of this type make a joke of margin requirements. Beyond that, other types of derivatives severely curtail the ability of regulators to curb leverage and generally get their arms around the risk profiles of banks, insurers and other financial institutions. Similarly, even experienced investors and analysts encounter major problems in analyzing the financial condition of firms that are heavily involved with derivatives contracts. When Charlie and I finish reading the long footnotes detailing the derivatives activities

  • 2005 letter 0.524

    Were market variables to change so as to favor securitization (an unlikely event), we could sell part of our portfolio and eliminate the related debt. Until then, we prefer better profits to better cosmetics.

    Full passage · 3,075 characters

    less money. Were market variables to change so as to favor securitization (an unlikely event), we could sell part of our portfolio and eliminate the related debt. Until then, we prefer better profits to better cosmetics. 3) At MidAmerican, we have substantial debt, but it is that company’s obligation only. Though it will appear on our consolidated balance sheet, Berkshire does not guarantee it. Even so, this debt is unquestionably secure because it is serviced by MidAmerican’s diversified stream of highly-stable utility earnings. If there were to be some bolt from the blue that hurt one of MidAmerican’s utility properties, earnings from the others would still be more than ample to cover all debt requirements. Moreover, MidAmerican retains all of its earnings, an equity- building practice that is rare in the utility field. From a risk standpoint, it is far safer to have earnings from ten diverse and uncorrelated utility operations that cover interest charges by, say, a 2:1 ratio than it is to have far greater coverage provided by a single utility. A catastrophic event can render a single utility insolvent – witness what Katrina did to the local electric utility in New Orleans – no matter how conservative its debt policy. A geographical disaster – say, an earthquake in a Western state – can’t have the same effect on MidAmerican. And even a worrier like Charlie can’t think of an event that would systemically decrease utility earnings in any major way. Because of MidAmerican’s ever- widening diversity of regulated earnings, it will always utilize major amounts of debt. And that’s about it. We are not interested in incurring any significant debt at Berkshire for acquisitions or operating purposes. Conventional business wisdom, of course, would argue that we are being too conservative and that there are added profits that could be safely earned if we injected moderate leverage into our balance sheet. Maybe so. But many of Berkshire’s hundreds of thousands of investors have a large portion of their net worth in our stock (among them, it should be emphasized, a large number of our board and key managers) and a disaster for the company would be a disaster for them. Moreover, there are people who have been permanently injured to whom we owe insurance payments that stretch out for fifty years or more. To these and other constituencies we have promised total security, whatever comes: financial panics, stock-exchange closures (an extended one occurred in 1914) or even domestic nuclear, chemical or biological attacks. We are quite willing to accept huge risks. Indeed, more than any other insurer, we write high-limit policies that are tied to single catastrophic events. We also own a large investment portfolio whose market value could fall dramatically and quickly under certain conditions (as happened on October 19, 1987). Whatever occurs, though, Berkshire will have the net worth, the earnings streams and the liquidity to handle the problem with ease. Any other approach is dangerous. Over the years, a number of very smart people have

  • 2003 letter 0.523

    And now it’s confession time: I’m sure I could have saved you $100 million or so, pre-tax, if I had acted more promptly to shut down Gen Re Securities.

    Full passage · 3,017 characters

    words, “Ignorance more frequently begets confidence than does knowledge.” And now it’s confession time: I’m sure I could have saved you $100 million or so, pre-tax, if I had acted more promptly to shut down Gen Re Securities. Both Charlie and I knew at the time of the General Reinsurance merger that its derivatives business was unattractive. Reported profits struck us as illusory, and we felt that the business carried sizable risks that could not effectively be measured or limited. Moreover, we knew that any major problems the operation might experience would likely correlate with troubles in the financial or insurance world that would affect Berkshire elsewhere. In other words, if the derivatives business were ever to need shoring up, it would commandeer the capital and credit of Berkshire at just the time we could otherwise deploy those resources to huge advantage. (A historical note: We had just such an experience in 1974 when we were the victim of a major insurance fraud. We could not determine for some time how much the fraud would ultimately cost us and therefore kept more funds in cash-equivalents than we normally would have. 16 Absent this precaution, we would have made larger purchases of stocks that were then extraordinarily cheap.) Charlie would have moved swiftly to close down Gen Re Securities – no question about that. I, however, dithered. As a consequence, our shareholders are paying a far higher price than was necessary to exit this business. • Though we include Gen Re’s sizable life and health reinsurance business in the “insurance” sector, we show the results for Ajit Jain’s life and annuity business in this section. That’s because this business, in large part, involves arbitraging money. Our annuities range from a retail product sold directly on the Internet to structured settlements that require us to make payments for 70 years or more to people severely injured in accidents. We’ve realized some extra income in this business because of accelerated principal payments we received from certain fixed-income securities we had purchased at discounts. This phenomenon has ended, and earnings are therefore likely to be lower in this segment during the next few years. • We have a $604 million investment in Value Capital, a partnership run by Mark Byrne, a member of a family that has helped Berkshire over the years in many ways. Berkshire is a limited partner in, and has no say in the management of, Mark’s enterprise, which specializes in highly-hedged fixed-income opportunities. Mark is smart and honest and, along with his family, has a significant investment in Value. Because of accounting abuses at Enron and elsewhere, rules will soon be instituted that are likely to require that Value’s assets and liabilities be consolidated on Berkshire’s balance sheet. We regard this requirement as inappropriate, given that Value’s liabilities – which usually are above $20 billion – are in no way ours. Over time, other investors will join us

How it works

The steps behind the answer above, timed on the server.

  1. embed not timed by the server OpenAI text-embedding-3-small turns the question into a 768-dimension vector.
  2. search 681 ms Scored all 673 passages by cosine similarity and kept the top 5.
  3. answer 11,382 ms claude-opus-5-5 read the passages as search results and cited a letter year for each point.

AWS Lambda behind API Gateway at api.mays.co runs each step, with 24 seconds per request inside the gateway’s 29-second limit. The passage embeddings ship inside the Lambda package. Your AI assistant can search the same passages through the search_buffett_letters tool on my MCP server.